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If one were attempting to find a home for disability discourse within 
philosophy, the most obvious place to look would be bioethics. Discussions of 
disability are included in many of the difficult moral and biomedical issues which 
bioethics attempts to address, such as prenatal diagnosis, genetic testing for disabling 
conditions, abortion, euthanasia, sterilization of the mentally disabled, infanticide, 
health care resources, and questions of competence, informed consent, and quality 
of life. There is no doubt that the debates in these difficult areas are of great 
importance, not only philosophically, but for the individuals whose lives are directly 
affected by them. However, bioethics is not the only arena for philosophical 
discussions about disability. 
There are many philosophical issues surrounding disability that are beyond 
the realm of bioethics. Philosophers have begun to explore disability in the context 
of phenomenology, political and social philosophy, theories of embodiment, and 
feminism. However, much of the current literature focuses either explicitly on 
physical disability, speaks more generally about "disability" without differentiating 
between physical and cognitive disabilities, or discusses cognitive disability in terms 
which do not reflect the problematic nature of the category itself. Thus, !·would 
like to focus specifically on cognitive disability (1) because, though it has been 
given almost exclusive philosophical attention within a medical-moral context, I 
think it raises many profound questions that go beyond bioethics. I will begin with 
a brief sketch of the ways cognitive disabilities have been treated within bioethical 
discourse, give a number of reasons for going beyond this approach, and conclude 
with some reflections on other philosophical areas where cognitive disability is 
relevant and important. 
Cognitive disability has been given particular attention in bioethics. 
Specifically biomedical questions include prenatal testing and genetic screening 
for cognitive disabilities, aborting fetuses with such conditions, and the sterilization 
of the mentally disabled. These issues are discussed from a wide variety of ethical 
perspectives, and additional questions are often raised regarding rights, consent, 
competence, and definitions of personhood (i.e., are these individuals persons, and 
how should we treat them?). There are also difficult legal issues which arise in the 
context of cognitive disabilities: wrongful birth suits (2), surrogacy battles (3), and 
cases of infanticide ( 4 ). Finally, the topic of cognitive disability and its association 
with eugenics has been raised in connection with the philosophical and political 
controversies around the Human Genome Project and advances in genetics (including 
gene therapy and genetic screening). There is a mosaic of biomedical and ethical 
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issues involving cognitive disability, all of which are important and relevant to 
health care professionals, philosophers, and most significantly, the individuals 
defined as cognitively disabled themselves. Yet there are additional philosophical 
questions concerning cognitive disability which lie beyond bioethics. Before 
exploring a few of these alternatives, I would first like to offer three reasons for this 
philosophical reorientation: the first is philosophical, and has to do with the nature 
and limits of bioethical discourse; the second is political; and the last, historical. 
Given that bioethics generally deals with moral questions surrounding 
biomedical issues, philosophers often assume a medical model of disability. The 
cognitively disabled are viewed as having a medically classifiable, uniform condition 
(e.g. Down's Syndrome, mental retardation) with an underlying biological cause, 
despite the fact that in many cases the etiology is unknown (as in 75% of cases of 
menta} retardation), and the range of severity can differ tremendously and is often 
difficult to predict. Some discussions are restricted to the "mild" or "severely" 
mentally retarded (usually focusing upon the latter) and acknowledge that the moral 
questions may be very different depending on the degree of severity. However, the 
boundaries of these categories are not always clearly defined, and the very 
designation of sub.groups is not unproblematic. The variety encompassed under 
the classification of "mental retardation", even within the sub·categories of "mild", 
"moderate", and "severe", makes generalizations difficult. As Robert Edgerton 
observes in his account of the lives of persons with mental retardation, "Mental 
retardation is not a unitary disorder .... Both etiologically and descriptively, mental 
retardation is heterogenous." (5) Thus, there are many pressing philosophical 
questions about the nature of the classification itself. Is mental retardation a 
biological or social category, or both? (6) There is an undeniable social dimension 
to this classification, and to treat it as a unified medical disorder is to ignore its · 
complexity and political nature. (7) As James Trent comments in his introduction 
to Inventing the Feeble Mind: 
The problem of mental retardation is a social problem because it is equally 
a problem of mental acceleration ... .It is important to understand that image 
of mental retardation as a 'thing', the object of scientific understanding 
and intervention, conceals a history shaped by the implicit political choices 
of the mentally accelerated. (8) · 
Much of the biomedical and moral discourse on cognitive disability does 
not take into account the social nature of disabiiity, and ignores the intricacies and 
,ambiguities of these classifications. A striking example of this can be found in the 
1 bioethical debates about aborting fetuses with disabilities. It is not unusual for mental 
retardation and Down's Syndrome to be presented as the morally "unproblematic 
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cases", where it is clear, and sometimes expected, that a woman would choose to 
abort. (Things are more morally complicated in cases of physical disabilities such 
as blindness, or missing limbs.) This simplistic representation of cognitive disabilities 
obscures the important fact that it is impossible to determine their severity in utero, 
and both reflects and perpetuates the stigma associated with these conditions. I 
think that there is important philosophical work to be done in examining the nature 
and construction of these categories, as well as critically evaluating the ways in 
which cognitive disability is represented within bioethical discourse. 
In addition to the philosophical reasons for going beyond bioethics, there 
is a political one as well. If one takes a survey of the topics under which cognitive 
disability is included in bioethics, an overwhelming number focus on whether or 
not it can and/or should be avoided (e.g. prenatal screening, genetic testing, the 
Human Genome Project, sterilization, infanticide, reproductive technology as an 
alternative for couples who would otherwise have a child with a cog9itive disability). 
I would argue that there is an implicit political message being sent by restricting 
philosophical discourse to these biomedical issues. If philosophy is going to include 
disability as an area of inquiry, it is important that it include topics which do not 
center around one underlying theme: prevention. 
The final reason for going beyond biomedical and moral considerations of 
cognitive disability is historical. As Trent has suggested, there is a political story 
intertwined with the development of classifications such as mental retardation. What 
I find striking about its history is that, in the mid-nineteenth century, mental 
retardation emerged simultaneously as an object of medical and moral discourse. 
The moral character of the individual became as important to the classification as 
the medical diagnosis. In fact, many researchers in the field (including Alfred Binet, 
the father of the intelligence tests, and Edouard Seguin, often referred .to as the 
father of special education) included the moral aptitude of the individual in their 
definitions. By the 1880's the "moral imbecile" was defined as an individual whose 
defect was primarily moral, rather than intellectual. As we trace the history into the 
twentieth century, the identification of women as "feebleminded" and the 
incarceration of both men and women were often predicated upon their supposed 
immorality, not on any medical diagnosis. In light of this history, I think it is important 
to explore discourses which do not view the cognitively disabled as moral and/or 
medical problems to be solved. Many discussions in ethics focus on whether or not 
the cognitively disabled are persons, debate whether the severely cognitively disabled 
are akin to or morally equivalent to non-human animals, and question their status 
as members of our moral community. Unfortunately, by ignoring the history of 
these classifications, they often make arguments that sound remarkably similar to 
those presented almost a century ago. (9) 
As we have seen, there are historical, political and philosophical reasons to 
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extend our philosophical reflections beyond a purely moral and biomedical 
consideration of cognitive disability. I have already hinted at some of the directions 
in which philosophy might go, and would like to conclude by mentioning a few 
more possibilities. Given the importance accorded to rationality in Western 
philosophical thought, we might reexamine the history of philosophy from the 
perspective of cognitive disability. What did various philosophers have to say about 
mental disability? And at what point was mental disability distinguished from mental 
illness? English philosopher John Locke, for example, made a distinction between 
"idiots" and "madmen':. (10) The philosophies of Locke and Rousseau also had a 
great influence on the development of special education. In fact, Rousseau's 
definition of the infant in his famous study on education, Emile, is almost identical 
to Seguin's subsequent definition of the "idiot''; What is the relationship between 
philosophical theories of rationality and the way in which cognitive disability was 
defined pedagogically, as well as scientifically? How have definitions of Reason 
determined the nature of Reason's opposite? (11) To what extent has the concept of 
Reason defined the humanness and moral character of the cognitively disabled? 
Just as feminist philosophers have explored male biases in the Western philosophical 
tradition (12), disability scholars have a rich terrain to cultivate in assessing the 
philosophical significance of both physical and cognitive disability. 
Feminist scholarship has already contributed a great deal to the theorizing 
of disability. Susan Wendell, in her book The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical 
Reflections on Disability, offers profound insights into the nature of disability, the 
notion of disability as difference, embodiment, and feminist ethics. Though her 
book focuses on physical disability, I think that much of what she argues can and 
should be extended to cognitive disability. I am particularly compelled by her 
discussion of the "cognitive and social authority of medicine". She defines cognitive 
authority as "the authority to have one's descriptions of the world taken seriously, 
believed, or accepted generally as truth". (13) Her claim that persons with disabilities 
have had their experiences invalidated is particularly true of those who are seen as 
cognitively disabled. By definition, they lack the ability to have the kind of cognitive 
authority which the medical profession commands, and their attempts at self-
definition have only become public in the past two to three decades. (14) There are 
numerous epistemological issues to be· unraveled, including the production and 
privileging of knowledge, the possibility of individuals with cognitive disabilities 
acting as knowing subjects rather than scientific objects, and how the knowledge 
produced about them affects their self-perception, and ultimately shapes the 
categories themselves. (15) 
This leads to another rich venue of philosophical reflection: theorizing 
oppression and power. Many philosophers have explored the nature of oppression, 
and while there are many theories of oppression which apply to the physically 
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disabled, they are not always relevant to the cognitively disabled. The problem of 
exclusion, in general, is particularly salient in the context of cognitive disability. 
Insofar as many of these individuals are deemed incapable of the kind of scholarship 
and theoretical work that is required to take part in philosophical discourse,. their 
voices are almost always excluded. Given the progress made by feminists (able-
bodied and disabled) towards inclusion, this silence is especially troublesome. One 
solution to this problem has been offered by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. 
In many of his works, he examines the relationship between discourses (e.g., 
scientific, pedagogical, institutional), knowledge, and power. He argues that power 
relations imply the possibility ofresistance, and that power can "come from below". 
(16) He calls for "genealogical research", a method which brings forth "subjugated 
knowledges .... those knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate ... naive 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of 
cognition or scientificity." (17) A genealogy of cognitive disability is long overdue. 
These are only a few directions in which philosophers of disability might 
explore. (An additional task is to theorize the very distinction I have made between 
"physical" and "mental" or "cognitive" disability). Bioethicists and moral theorists 
have already established a philosophical home for disability studies. However, in 
an effort to generate broader and more inclusive philosophies of disability, I think 
that it is both philosophically fruitful and politically necessary to extend 
philosophical reflections on disability beyond the boundaries of bioethics. 
Notes 
1. I recognize the plurality of terms in current use, including "developmental 
disability", "mental disability", and "intellectual disability". For the purposes of 
this paper I have chosen the term "cognitive disability", by which I mean conditions 
that are believed to impair an individual's cognitive abilities, and that do not 
necessarily have a biological cause or physically disabling effect (e.g. mental 
retardation, Down's Syndrome). I also distinguish cognitive disabilities from mental 
illnesses (e.g. schizophrenia, dementia, psychotic disorders). 
2. In these cases, parents of a child with a congenital abnormality or illness 
bring suit against a physician who has failed to provide appropriate prenatal testing 
or counseling, and whose failure resulted in the birth of their disabled child. 
3. There was a case in Michigan where a child who was commissioned 
through a surrogacy contract was born microcephalic. Upon the knowledge that the 
biological father was, in fact, the husband of the surrogate mother, not the intended 
adoptive father, a battle ensued as to who was responsible for the disabled child 
whom neither couple wanted. See "When No One Wants the Child", in ed. Kenneth 
Alpern, The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992) 335-337. 
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4. The best known case is the that of Baby Doe, a child with Down's 
Syn<!,rome and an esophageal defect who was left to die _after his parents decided 
not to repair the defect because of the child's cognitive disability. See "The Johns 
Hopkins Case", "Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns" and "Treating 
Baby Doe: The Ethics of Uncertainty", in eds. Beauchamp & Walters, Contemporary 
Issues in Bioethics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994) 413-430. 
5. Robert Edgerton, The Cloak of Competence, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993) 2. 
6. It is worth pointing out that in the DSM-IV definition of mental 
retardation, there is no purely biological criterion other than age of onset (which 
must be before 18 years). The other criteria are IQ level, and impairment in "adaptive 
functioning", which are both measured by psychological tests. The latest definition 
provided by the American Association on Mental Retardation deliberately highlights 
the social nature of mental retardation, and boasts a "paradigm shift, from a view of 
mental retardation as an absolute trait expressed solely by an individual to an 
expression of the interaction between the person with limited intellectual functioning 
and the environment". See Luckasson, Mental Retardation: Definition, 
Classification, and Systems of Supports, 9th Edition, (American Association on 
Mental Retardation, 1992). 
7. For an interesting account of the political factors in the genesis of Down's 
Syndrome as a classification, see Chris Borthwick, "Racism, IQ, and Down's 
Syndrome", Disability and Society, vol.11 No.3, 1990. 
8. James W. Trent, Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental 
Retardation in the United States, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) 
7. 
9. In an article written in Philosophy & Public Affairs on the cognitively · 
disabled and justice, I was amazed to find that the author uses the terms "idiot", 
"idiocy", "moron" and "dullard", without qualification. These were all actual 
scientific sub-groups of the "feebleminded", but were abandoned decades ago 
(though they remain in our everyday language as pejorative terms). See Jeff 
McMahan, "Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice", in Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, vol.25, 1, 1996, 3-35. 
10. SeeJohnLocke,AnEssay Conceming Human Understanding, (London: 
William Tegg, 1900) 105-6. 
11. The French philosopher Michel Foucault examined this very question 
in his fascinating book, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age 
of Reason, (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). Though he focuses exclusively on 
mental illness, his work is historically and politically relevant to cognitive disability 
as well. 
12. Genvieve Lloyd examines the "maleness of Reason" in her book The 
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Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, (New York: Routledge, 
1994). 
13. Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections 
on Disabilities, (New York: Routledge, 1996) 117. 
14. For an excellent account of the growing self-advocacy movement, see 
New Voices: Self-Advocacy by People with Disabilities, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Brookline Books, 1996). 
15. Ian Hacking calls this last effect the "looping effect of human kinds". 
His articles "Making Up People" and "The Looping Effect of Human Kinds" both 
address the relationship between categories and the classified individual. See 
"Making Up People" in eds. Heller, Sosna, Wellbery, Reconstructing Individualism, 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986); <'The Looping Effects of Human 
Kinds" in eds. Sperber, Premack, Premack, Causal Cognition: A Multi-disciplinary 
Approach, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
16. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1990) 94. 
17. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in ed. Colin Gordon, Power/ 
Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980) 82. 
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